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TORTS-Products Liability-Strict Liability is Imposed on the
Seller of a Defective Used Product
Hovenden v. Tenbush,
529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
Plaintiff Richard Hovenden purchased used bricks from the defendant
Wallace Tenbush, whose business was selling building materials including
new and used bricks. After the walls of the plaintiff's commerical building
deteriorated, suit was filed for damages resulting from the defective bricks.
Hovenden sought recovery on various theories, including strict liability in
tort, but the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the plaintiff insisted on the applicability of his theories of
recovery. Held-Reversed and Remanded. The doctrine of strict liability
imposes liability on the non-manufacturing seller of a defective used product.'

Strict liability in tort allows recovery to plaintiffs who plead and prove sev-

eral elements,2 and defendant may be liable even though he has exercised all
possible care. 3 The law of torts progressed slowly from a recognition of
fault as a basis for a wrongdoer's liability to the rapid and recent develop4
The
ment of the doctrine of strict liability in tort as a method of recovery.
5
doctrine was introduced early in a California Supreme Court case and Mr.7
6
Prosser's persuasive article convinced the courts to adopt such a doctrine.
1. Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no
writ).
2. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974). This case listed five elements needed for recovery: (a) defective
product, (b) defect existed when it left defendant's hand, (c) product was unreasonably
dangerous to plaintiff due to defect, (d) plaintiff suffered damage or injury, (e) defect
was proximate cause of injury.
. 3. Olsen v. Royal Metals Corp., 392 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1968) (containing
Texas authority in the opinion).
4. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 n.2 (Tex. 1967)
(contains elaborate citation of important and persuasive treatises and authorities in
development of the doctrine). See generally 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRiEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LLr4,Lrry § 19A, at 5-222 (1975); W. PROSSER., HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 75,
at 492-94 (4th ed. 1971); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the
Requirement of a Defect, 41 TExAs L. REv. 855 (1963); Sales, An Overview of Strict
Tort Liability in Texas, 11 Hous. L. REv. 1043 (1974); 63 AM. JuR. 2d Products
Liability § 123 (1972); Annot., 13 A.L.R. 3d 1057 (1967).
5. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (concurring
opinion).
6. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
7. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) (first
court to apply the doctrine, holding a manufacturer of a defective combination power
tool liable); accord, Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1964);
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Dealers Transp. Co. v.
Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441, 447 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
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The nationwide trend toward adoption influenced the American Law Institute to incorporate the doctrine of strict liability into Section 402A of the
Restatement of Torts, with accompanying comments." Observing the nationwide trend, the Texas Supreme Court in McKisson v. Sales Affiliates,

Inc.,9 adopted the rule of strict liability as stated in section 402A and today,
manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, retailers, and sellers are clearly
liable under this theory of recovery. 10 The Restatement, however, provides
no suggestion as to whether the doctrine of strict liability may be expanded
further to include manufacturers and sellers of used products.
Because there is no express direction from the Restatement or its comments, courts considering the question of liability for a defective used product
have hesitated in expanding the language, apparently, at times, influenced
because there was no precedent for such expansion. 1
Courts faced with the issue have given this area of the law some direction
with implied or express comments. For example, an Arizona appellate
court, though it disallowed recovery because plaintiff failed to meet the
burden of proving a defect in the product, made no mention of the used
product's precluding recovery under strict liability in any manner. 12 The
8.

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)

provides that the seller

of any defective product that is unreasonably dangerous to the user or to his property
may be liable for physical harm if he is in the business of selling such product and the
user receives it "without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold." Comment (b) indicates that the institute was merely reiterating what courts were beginning to
formulate as policy toward the seller of defective products that were unreasonably
dangerous.
9. 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (holding distributor strictly liable for plaintiff's
loss of hair and burns resulting from defective wave lotion preparation).
10. Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (manufacturers
and sellers); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964)
(retailers); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969) (manufacturers);
Franklin Serum Co. v. Hoover & Son, 418 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1967) (extended seller's
liability for damages to property of consumer); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (manufacturers and distributors); Shoppers World v. Villareal,
518 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ) (sellers); McLain v.
Hodge, 474 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (retailers);
Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher, 463 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970 writ dism'd)
(sellers); Sharp v. Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (cites several cases holding manufacturers liable); 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 28.31, at 1602 (1956) (wholesalers).
See
generally 72 C.J.S. Products Liability § 40 (Supp. 1975).
11. Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1971). The court
did not need to resolve the issue in this case because the plaintiff failed to prove that the
used 55 gallon drum was "inherently dangerous for its intended use." Id. at 841.
12. See Tucson Gen. Hosp. v. Russell, 437 P.2d 677, 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968)
(plaintiff did not prove that used x-ray machine that fell on her while she was on
hospital table was defective when it left manufacturer); Siemen v. Alden, 341 N.E.2d
713, 714-15 (Ill. Ct. App. 1976). The seller of defective used saw was not liiable since
it was isolated transaction. The fact that it was a used product did not influence the decision. See also Sharp v. Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Here the product was a defective used car; the court
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Oregon Supreme Court in 1971 stated in dictum that the strict liability rule
was not limited to new product sellers.' 3 While these courts were struggling
with the issue of liability for defective used products, several other courts
expressly held manufacturers of defective used products liable. 1 4 In Gibbs
v. General Motors Corp.,' 5 the manufacturer of a used 1961 Chevrolet
pickup was held liable when the ball-joint unit on the left front tire was
defective, causing the wheel to collapse and the truck to swerve into another
car. The importance of Gibbs is that strict liability was imposed on the
manufacturer even though the product had gone through several transactions
before reaching the Gibbs family.' 8 The next year the Waco Court of Civil
Appeals, in McClain v. Hodge,"7 was faced with a case in which the plaintiff
lost the vision of his right eye when a defective used rifle misfired while the

plaintiff was loading the gun. The court reversed the trial court and held that
the defendant, a retailer of new and used guns, was strictly liable for the personal injury resulting from the used and defective rifle.' 8 This decision becomes significant after a careful reading of the Restatement comment which
indicates that "sellers" may include "retail dealers."' 9 In Markle v. Mulholland's Inc.,20 the Oregon Supreme Court found the recapper-manufacturer,
the wholesaler, and the immediate seller liable under the strict liability
theory.
With the nationwide trend indicating an expansion in the area of strict
21
liability, it was logical for the courts to continue extending liability.
reversed and remanded for a determination of whether intervening causes destroyed the
defendant's liability.

13. Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 484 P.2d 299, 303 n.4 (Ore. 1971) (held the
driver of a used 1961 Plymouth with defective brakes could not recover against dealer
since there was no proof that used product was "unreasonably dangerous.").
14. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965) (purchaser of
reconditioned tractor whose brake system failed recovered against manufacturer of
brakes); Bombardi v. Pochel's Appliance & T.V. Co., 518 P.2d 202 (Wash. 1973)

(plaintiff recovered against manufacturer for defective used television that caused fire).
15. 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1970).

16. The appellate court opinion stated that Revel bought the vehicle new from
Beard's Chevrolet Co., who sold it or traded the truck to Libby's Coach Sales. Gibbs
then purchased the truck as a used product from Libby's Coach Sales. See Gibbs v.
General Motors Corp., 445 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland), rev'd, 450

S.W.2d
17.
18.
19.

827 (Tex. 1970).
474 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 775.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment (f) (1965).
FRUMER &M. FRIEDMAN, PRoDucTs LIn.iTy § 19A, at 5-223 (1975).

See also 2 L.

20. 509 P.2d 529, 535 (Ore. 1973).
21. Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 528 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975)

(held that the doctrine protects not only users and consumers, but also bystanders);
Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ)
(lessor of defective product held strictly liable). See generally Note, 6 ST. MxRv'S L.J.
751 (1974); Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 121 (1973) (concerns applicability of doctrine to
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Hovenden v. Tenbush 22 was a case of first impression in Texas, dealing with
the issue of the liability of the seller of a defective used product. The court
relied on Markle declaring that this imposition of liability on the immediate
seller, wholesaler, and manufacturer "clearly supported" imposing liability
on the seller of defective used bricks. 23 Furthermore, the court found that
the Gibbs decision imposing liability on the manufacturer of a used truck
and the McLain determination that a retailer of a used rifle was liable, was
consistent with the decision to hold the seller of defective used bricks
liable. 24 Finally, the court noted that the Restatement did not preclude
imposing liability and that the facts in Hovenden would be compared to
lease cases since the leased property is by necessity a used product. 25
Although courts of civil appeals are frequently reluctant to extend doctrines, usually relying upon the supreme court for such action, 26 Hovenden
clearly extended liability to a seller of a defective used product and
diminished a seller's attempt to avoid the McLain holding because of the
facts. 27 It is significant to note that the court did not emphasize reasons
that other courts had given for the strict liability rule as a significant factor in
the expansive decision. Prior decisions placed great emphasis on this factor
in the determination of whether the court should extend the strict liability
doctrine to manufacturers of used products. 28 Hovenden de-emphasized
obtaining an inference from the basis of the strict liability doctrine that
would aid in the determination of whether to extend the doctrine.
The frequent use, however, of the basis of strict liability as an important
factor in determining whether the doctrine should be extended warrants a
careful study and analysis of these concepts. A comment to the Restatement
indicates that "public policy" burdens the seller with the cost of injuries
sustained because of his ability to protect himself through liability insurance
and because he may treat such expense as a production cost.2 9 Still another
lessors of personal property); Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 415 (1970) (contains authority on
recovery by non-purchasers and non-users).
22. 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ). The Hovenden
opinion clearly explained how the Texas cases may be distinguished on the facts
involved.
23. Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 535 (Ore. 1973).
24. Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1975, no writ).
25. The lessor of a defective leased chattel is now strictly liable in tort. See Rourke
v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).
26. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex. 1967).
27. There had been some doubt as to how strong McLain v. Hodge would be since
the defendant in that case, although held liable, had sold the gun new, bought it from the
original buyer, and then resold it to the plaintiff.
28. E.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965); Gibbs v. General
Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1970); Bombardi v. Pochel's Appliance & T.V. Co.,
518 P.2d 202 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
29. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment (c) (1965). Some
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comment indicates that the doctrine applies to those who sell products for
consumption and use.8 0 This concept is known as the "enterprise liability
rationale."'" Some courts and legal scholars have rejected the theory of
"enterprise liability" as the rationale for the adoption of section 402A.8 2
Specifically, the Hovenden court discounted the theory that liability of the
seller depends on whether he has represented that the product in question
meets a particular standard. 8 This "representational conduct" theory is
inconsistent with the "enterprise liability" theory, which the appellant relied
on in Hovenden,8 4 because it imposes liability only if the seller made a
representation and the buyer relied upon it. More emphasis should be
placed on these theories because some recent cases deciding the issue of
whether a seller of a defective used product is strictly liable have based the
holdings on these theories.
While some recent cases are in accord with Hovenden, others have held to
the contrary, or may be distinguishable on their facts. In 1974, the New
Jersey Supreme Court recognized that they were faced with "the novel
question" of the strict liability of a retail seller of a used product, but refused
to answer the "broad question" and laid down a narrow rule that a used car
dealer who conducted repair work on the used car prior to a sale was strictly
liable in tort.8 5 Another recent opinion embraced the question of the
courts would categorize this concept as risk-spreading instead of enterprise liability. See
Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment (f) (1965).
31. McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1968) (states that
doctrine provides "judicial protection" to the "defenseless consumer"); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) (one of the early cases using the
enterprise liability rationale); Markle v. Mulholland's Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 532-34 (Ore.
1973) (discusses both the rationale of enterprise liability and that of representational
tort); Davis. v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682, 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1973, writ refd n.r.e.) (describes principal justification for strict liability as "loss
spreading"). See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and
Requirement of a Defect, 41 TExAS L. REv. 855, 858-59 (1963).
32. E.g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 863 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968) (expressly rejects the idea that liability should be imposed because sellers are best riskbearers); Markle v. Mulholland's Inc., 509 P.2d 529,
539 (Ore. 1973) (specially concurring opinion) (section 402A liability may be based on
various other theories); Freedman, The Texas Politics of Today's Products Liability, 5
ST. MARY'S L.J. 16 (1973) (calls enterprise liability an "un-principle" of products
liability).
33. Markle v. Mulholland's 'Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 539 (Ore. 1973) (concurring
opinion); Cornelius v. Bay Motors Inc., 484 P.2d 299, 308 (Ore. 1974) (concurring
opinion); Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624, 628 (Ore. 1965) (if enterprise
liability was adopted, liability would be extended any time a loss could be distributed).
34. Brief for Appellant, Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1975, no writ). The appellant attempted to convince the court of the
validity of the "enterprise liability" theory, so that it would expand that doctrine to
encompass holding the seller liable on these "policy considerations." Id. at 8.
35. Realmuto v. Straub Motors, 322 A.2d 440, 444 (N.J. 1974) (plaintiff recovered
for personal injuries due to accident caused by defective accelerator-carburetor in used
car).
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liability of sellers of defective used products. 6 The court held that they
were not implying that there could never be liability when a used product
was sold, but that it would refuse to hold the seller of used automotive parts
strictly liable in tort. The court expressed the fear that to hold otherwise
would induce Arizona courts to extend liability to all sellers of used
products. 37 Moreover, in predicting the effect of holding the seller liable,
the court stated that this would inflict a "severe economic blow" since dealers
would have to follow a three-pronged requirement of repairing and inspecting parts before the sale, warning of the dangers in using secondhand parts,
and insuring against the possible liability for personal injuries resulting from
the use of the used product.38
In Peterson v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.,3 9 the Illinois Supreme Court
declared that a used car seller was not liable as a matter of law for damages
resulting because of the used automobile's defective brakes. The persuasive
opinion began by explaining the manufacturers were held to be strictly liable
because of the enterprise liability rationale whereby they were burdened with
payment because they created the risk and profited from it. 40 Secondly, the
judge explained that liability had been extended to retailers and wholesalers
because they occupy a position in the marketing process whereby they may
"exert pressure on the manufacturer to enhance the safety of the product."'4 .
Finally, the court reasoned that the defendant was not liable because, being
outside the original producing and marketing chain, such imposition of
liability would make the used car dealer an insurer of defects resulting "after
the chain of distribution was completed" and while consumers had control of
the product. 42 The dissenting judge would agree with the Hovenden
decision, but reasons that sellers of defective used products can be said to
have created the risk and thereby profited by introducing the product into
43
commerce like manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers.
Other authorities apparently would disagree with the Peterson decision
denying recovery to the plaintiff because the transaction was outside the
original producing and marketing chain. Explaining that the bailor of a
defective used product is strictly liable, it has been stated that one should
36. Rix v. Reeves, 532 P.2d 185 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975). Plaintiff purchased a used
wheel that supports the tire "with a lock ring or rim," which "exploded" from the wheel
the next day, striking plaintiff in the mouth and causing personal injuries.
37. Id. at 187.
38. Id. at 187.
39. 329 N.E.2d 785 (III. 1975). See also Comment, Strict Products Liability for
Used Car Dealers, 63 KY.L. REv. (1975) (article written before the Peterson reversal).
40. Peterson v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785, 786 (Ill. 1975).
41. Id. at 787.
42. Id. at 787.
43. Id. at 787 (dissenting opinion).
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distinguish between new or used chattels, implying that the same rule should
44
apply to a defective used product seller.
At first glance, the cases enunciating either a narrow rule, 45 a reluctance
to expand strict liability, 46 or an express denial of such expansion 47 appear
to be very well reasoned opinions. But such arguments to limit strict liability
were refuted by a New Jersey court 48 that economically analyzed the
concept of enterprise liability and concluded that those who sell used
products "may similarly distribute their costs of doing business which, in
turn, will reflect what is considered by the public to be justifiable
expecta'49
tions regarding safety, quality and durability of used goods."
There is no apparent trend in these recent decisions; however, what
appears to be common to all is the use of the "enterprise rationale" in cases
admitting that the rule applies and in those denying recovery against the
seller of defective used products.5 0 These recent decisions indicate that the
courts are attempting to reach a fair solution to the question of who will be
burdened with the expenses incurred when a defective used product causes
an injury to a plaintiff. Courts must continue answering the question of
whether to burden the seller because he may distribute the loss to buyers of
other products or to neglect the plaintiff and declare that he has no remedy
since such decision would be unfair to the seller of the used product. The
recent cases indicate that injustices may result regardless of whom the court
holds liable. The line of cases denying recovery to the injured plaintiff has
added another factor limiting the defendant's liability by deciding that those
who are classified as sellers of used products are not strictly liable in tort. On
the other hand, those cases allowing recovery against a seller of a used
product alleviate the plaintiff's burden by requiring proof of only the
traditional elements for strict liability recovery., 1
The Hovenden court based its reasoning more on logic than on public
policy. In one of the major arguments the court stated that to hold
otherwise it would have to change the Restatement's words from the
44. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FREDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A (4)(b)(iv), at 3-283
(1975).
45. Realmuto v. Straub Motors, 322 A.2d 440, 444 (N.J. 1974).
46. Rix v. Reeves, 532 P.2d 185 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
47. Peterson v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785 (Ill. 1975).
48. Turner v. International Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 70 (N.J. App. Ct. 1975)

(court determined that questions of fact as to strict liability should be decided at the
trial).
49. Id. at 71. The court stated that the Restatement strict liability rule applies to
the sale of a defective used product.
50. Peterson v. Bachrodt Chev. Co., 329 N.E.2d 785 (Ill. 1975) (denied recovery);
Turner v. International Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 71 (N.J. App. Ct. 1975) (stated
that rule applied to used products).
51. Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974).
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imposition of liability on a seller of "any product" to "any new product." 52
A recent article critizing what appears to be the only previous Texas decision
on the subject of the applicability of the implied warranty of merchantability
to the sale of used goods, has advanced arguments that would extend the
Hovenden logic. 53 The author argues that the mere mention of "goods"
instead of "used goods" does not preclude the finding that a "used good was
intended" since such conclusion would apparently exclude "new goods"
because they are not expressly mentioned. Such argument seems to be
useful in a Hovenden fact situation.
Hovenden clearly extended strict liability to include sellers of used
defective products. The court's decision was a logical continuation and
expansion of the change from a "sell and forget" philosophy to one requiring
the acceptance of legal obligations and responsibilities. 54 This extension of
liability may cause future sellers of defective used products to protect
themselves by alternative defenses 55 rather than merely asking for summary
judgment.5 6 Moreover, if Texas should decide to become what appears to
be the only minority rule state that denies recovery under implied warranty
of merchantability in the sale of used goods, plaintiffs may prefer strict
liability in tort as a better cause of action in light of the Hovenden decision. 57
Notwithstanding the Restatement's inconclusiveness, the court has removed any doubt remaining from prior case law. When the Texas Supreme
Court reviews the issue of liability of sellers of defective used products, an
analysis of Hovenden and other out of state authorities will provide sufficient
52. Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1975, no writ).
53. Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ); Comment, UCC Implied Warranty of Merchantability and Used Goods, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 630 (1974).

54. See G.

PETERS, PRODUcT LIAUBrry AND SAFETY

2 (1971).

55. See, e.g., McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364, 367-68 (5th Cir. 1968);
McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tex. 1967); Shamrock Fuel &
Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 406 S.W.2d 483, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, no writ).
See also Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
56. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1970); Hovenden v.
Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
57. The law is not completely settled in this area. In Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner
Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no
writ), the court held that no implied warranty of merchantability existed where the
buyer knew that the goods were used. But see Larson, Commercial Transactions, 29 Sw.
L.J. 118, 131-32 (1975) (questions Chaq and says that official comment 3 of UCC 2314 seems to allow plaintiff recovery for implied warranty of merchantability in used
good sales); Comment, UCC Implied Warranty of Merchantability and Used Goods, 26
BAYLOR L. REV. 630 (1974)
(refuses to accept Chaq reasoning and suggests a "better
approach" that Texas follow majority view by applying warranty of merchantability to
used goods). See also Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts
Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REv. 123 (1974)
(answers "no" to his question and discusses differences between strict liability in tort and
UCC implied warranty liability).
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